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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IDA JOYCE WILSON, 
Appellant/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, WORKMENfS COMPENSATION 
DIVISION, 
Respondents/Defendants• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT,, QF_ ISSUE, PRESENTED, QN__ APPEAL 
1, Was the Industrial Commission correct in concluding that 
the applicant, Ida Joyce Wilson, did not sustain back injuries as 
a result of a compensable industrial accident which allegedly 
occurred on September 7, 1984? 
STATEMENT.OF_TBIL CASE 
A Petition for Writ of Review was filed by the plaintiff, Ida 
Joyce Wilson for review of an Order of the Industrial Commission 
holding that Mrs. Wilson did not sustain injuries as a result of a 
compensable industrial accident on September 7, \HH4f and thereby 
denying her claim for benefits. 
DISPQSITIQEL BY_ THE,INDUSTRIAL, COMMISSION 
A hearmq was held on June 13, 1985 before the Industrial 
Commission Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffitt on Ida Joyce 
Industrial Commission 
No. 85000166 
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Wilson's application for workmen's compensation benefits. On 
September 17, 1985 an Order was entered by Judge Moffitt denying 
Mrs. Wilson's claim for benefits. 
A Motion for Review was filed by Ida Joyce Wilson on October 
2, 1985. On October 23, 1985 the Industrial Commission denied the 
Motion for Review, and the Administrative Law Judge's Order was 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1984 Mrs. Ida Joyce Wilson was employed as a 
cook for the Utah State School for the Deaf and Blind. At that 
time she had held that position of employment for two years. 
(R 17) On September 7, 1984 the Utah State School for the Deaf 
and Blind was sponsoring a cookout for the staff, teachers, and 
others associated with the school. Mrs. Wilson, along with a 
co-worker, Barbara Dalpias, and their supervisor, Mr. Richard 
Cobb, went to Mrs. Dalpias's home to pick up a large portable 
grill which was to be used for the cookout. (R 18) Mrs. Cobb 
wheeled the portable grill from Mrs. Dalpias's shed to the back of 
a State truck which had been backed up next to the curb. (R 18) 
Mrs. Wilson claims that once the grill had been wheeled to the 
back of the truck, Mr. Cobb ordered Mrs. Wilson to take hold of 
the left handle of the grill while he had hold of the right 
handle. Mrs. Wilson alleges that she and Mr. Cobb lifted the 
grill into the back of the truck, thereby sustaining injuries to 
her back. (R 19, 20, 23) It is Mr. Cobb's and Mrs. Dalpias's 
contention that Mr. Cobb alone lifted the grill into the truck 
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while Mrs. Dalpias and Mrs. Wilson were on either side of the 
grill so as to steady it so it wouldn't tip over. (R 140-143; 
exhibits D-7 and D-8) 
On September 20, 1984, Mrs. Wilson sought medical treatment 
from Dr. Richard Barton. She was also treated by Dr. Bruce 
Sorenson. No mention was made to either of these treating 
physicians of the possible industrial nature of her problems until 
December of 1984. (R 40 and 147). Mrs. Wilson stated that the 
reason she did not promptly tell Dr. Barton about lifting the 
grill was because she was not certain whether that was the cause 
of her problem. (R 46) It was not until December of 1984 that 
Mrs. Wilson reached the conclusion that her back was injured by 
allegedly lifting the grill. (R 60) 
This was not the first incident in which Mrs. Wilson has had 
problems with her lower back. In 1978, while working as a laborer 
at a potatoe processing plant, she complained of cervical and low 
back pain, and was treated by one Dr. West on five separate 
occasions. X-rays disclosed a severe lumbar C-curve to the left 
with rotation. (R 51 and 147) In May of 1982, while working as a 
grill cook at the Mill Stream Restaurant, Mrs. Wilson was also 
treated for severe lower back pains. In 1984, Mrs. Wilson told 
Dr. Barton that her present condition first bothered her on May 
28, 1982. (R 57 and 147) 
In the "Initial Report" to the Public Employees Health 
Program which was signed by Dr. Barton on September 26, 1984, it 
is stated that the incident of injury is "not known." (R 123; 
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exhibit D-4) In an "Application for Treatment" form completed by 
Mrs. Wilson for Dr. Barton on September 20, 1984f the following 
questions and answers appear: 
Question: How did this condition develop? (What caused it? 
How did it start?) 
Answer: Car wreck 17 years ago. A job which required heavy 
lifting 9 years ago. 
Question: When was the first time you were aware of this 
problem? 
Answer: 6 years ago. 
Question: Have you ever had this problem or similar problems 
before? If yes, please explain. 
Answer: Yes, after the car wreck. 
Question: Any accidents, falls, etc. that might have caused 
your problem? 
Answer: Heavy lifting 9 years ago. 
(R 130-131; exhibit D-4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ida Joyce Wilson alleges that she sustained injuries to her 
back during the course of employment/ while lifting a portable 
grill on September 7, 1984. It is respondents contention that 
although Mrs. Wilson is suffering from back problems, these 
injuries were not the result of a compensable accident. In 
examining the entire record, there is much evidence which contra-
dicts Mrs. Wilsonfs allegations. Further, the Administrative Law 
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Judge concluded that Mrs. Wilson's testimony was not convincing 
nor credible. 
A decision of the Industrial Commission may not be overturned 
unless said decision is arbitrary or capricious, wholly without 
cause, or without any substantial evidence to support it. Because 
the order of the Industrial Commission was not arbitrary or 
capricious, the Supreme Court is powerless to direct an award of 
compensation benefits. Therefore, the decision of the Industrial 
Commission which denied benefits to Mrs. Wilson, must be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION WHICH DENIED 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO IDA JOYCE WILSON 
WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS, WHOLLY WITHOUT 
CAUSE, OR WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT IT? AND THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT BE OVERTURNED. 
The appellant in the case at bar, Ida Joyce Wilson, contends 
that the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that she did 
not sustain injuries as a result of a compensable industrial 
accident. Mrs. Wilson has petitioned this Court to review the 
Commissions Order denying her workmen's compensation benefits. 
The standard of review which has been utilized by this Court 
in Industrial Commission cases is stringent and there are numerous 
cases which have articulated the power or scope of review which 
the Utah Supreme Court possesses with regard to decisions handed 
down by the Industrial Commission. One such case which clearly 
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sets forth the proper standard is Kaiser Steel, Corporation 
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). In Kaiser, the Court 
stated: 
Under any of these standards . . . it is 
apparent that this Courts1 function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a 
strictly limited one in which the question is 
not whether the Court agrees with the Commis-
sion's findings or whether they are supported 
by the preponderance of evidence. Insteadf 
the reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or 
capricious," or "wholly without cause" or 
contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion 
from the evidence" or without "any substantial 
evidence" to support them. Only then should 
the Commissions findings be displaced. 
631 P.2d at 890. 
!n K a i s e r , t h e Court a l s o c i t e d wi th approva l Kfi^SlinaKis 
^ ^ I U d U 5 i i i a l CfiffiMsslfllJr 67 Utah 174, 181-82, 184, 246 P 698, 
700, 701 (1926) : 
What we hold is that in case . . . we are 
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions 
of the commission which appear to be in con-
flict with or contrary to the evidence, it 
must be clearly made to appear to us that the 
commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously 
and wholly without cause in rejecting or 
refusing to give effect to the evidence 
. . . Any other conclusion would make this 
court merely a reviewing court with power to 
weight the probative effect of the evidence 
. . . Unless therefore it can be said, upon 
the whole record, that the Commission clearly 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making 
its findings and decision, this court is 
powerless to interfere. Such is the manifest 
purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act . . . It was not intended, 
. . . that this Court, in matters of evidence, 
should to any extent substitute its judgment 
for the judgment of the commission. 
631 P.2d at 889 
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Norri_s_y_.__Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413, 
(1936) is another case which was concerned with the scope of 
review which the Supreme Court may exercise over a decision handed 
down by the Industrial Commission. Norris was also cited with 
approval in the Kaiser opinion. 
In Norrig, the applicant appealed from an order of the 
Industrial Commission which denied her benefits. The applicant 
based her appeal upon the contention that the uncontradicted 
testimony clearly showed that her husband died as a result of 
injuries incurred while in the course of employment and that the 
decision of the Industrial Commission was contrary to and not 
sustained by any substantial evidence. 
In its' opinion affirming the order of the Industrial 
Commission, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Again, therefore, we have the old case of 
a conflict of evidence which it is for the 
commission to resolve. It may be well to sum 
up the principles laid down in a number of 
previous cases regarding the jurisdiction of 
this court over awards and orders of the 
commission. 
The Legislature has, in effect, said: 
"The Commission is the final arbiter of the 
facts. If there is error in judgment or 
conclusions of or from facts, it must be the 
Commission's error and remain there. We 
give the Supreme Court the right to speak only 
by warrant of law in compensation cases when 
it speaks in reference to errors of law 
alleged to have been made by the Commis-
sion." . . . 
Where the matter presented on appeal is 
the question of whether the commission should 
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact 
different from that at which it did arrive 
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from the evidence, a question of law is 
presented only when it is claimed that the 
commission could only arrive at one conclusion 
from the evidence, and that it found contrary 
to that inevitable conclusion* But in order 
to reverse the commission in this regard it 
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is 
uncontradicted, and (b) there is nothing in 
the record which,is intrinsically discrediting 
to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that 
the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly that 
of interested witnesses or, if the uncontra-
dicted evidence is wholly or partly from 
others than interested witnesses, that the 
record shows no bias or prejudice on the part 
of such other witnesses, and (d) the uncontra-
dicted evidence is such as to carry a measure 
of conviction to the reasonable mind and 
sustain the burden of proof, and (e) precludes 
any other explanation or hypothesis as being 
more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there 
is nothing in the record which would indicate 
that the presence of the witnesses gave the 
commission such an advantage over the court in 
aid to its conclusions that the conclusions 
should for that reason not be disturbed. 
If the commission should decide against 
the uncontradicted evidence under those 
conditions, its decision would as a matter of 
law be arbitrary and capricious, which is 
another way of saying that it would be 
unreasonable. 
61 P.2d at 415. 
Elsewhere in the Norris case, the Court said: 
A reading of the record convinces us that the 
commission might well have found that the 
death was caused by the accident [and there-
fore be compensable]. We are not prepared to 
say that the record does not show that the 
more probable cause of [death was the work 
related injury rather than some independent 
cause], but it is not our province to measure 
the relative probabilities. That is for the 
commission. 
61 P.2d at 414. 
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Accordingly, applying the above cited authority to the case 
at bar, the Supreme Court is powerless to overturn the Industrial 
Commissions order unless it can be said that based upon the entire 
record, the Industrial Commission clearly acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in denying the Wilson workmen's compensation bene-
fits. To determine whether or not the Commission acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously, we may refer to the Norrls decision 
wherein the Court stated that in a situation such as the one in 
the case at bar, a reviewable question of law is presented only 
when it is claimed that the commission could arrive at only one 
conclusion from the evidence, and that if found contrary to that 
inevitable conclusion. 
Assuming that Ida Wilson did make the contention that based 
upon the evidence the commission could have reached only one 
inevitable conclusion, and failed to reach that conclusion, there 
are certain criteria which must be met in order to conclude that 
the decision was arbitrary and capricious, thereby allowing a 
reversal of the commissions order. 
This "test," as set forth in Norris, for determining whether 
or not a decision is arbitrary and capricious is set forth in the 
conjunctive such that each of the six criteria must be met to 
warrant a reversal of the order. 61 P.2d at 415. The first two 
criteria which Morris refers to is that the evidence is uncontra-
dicted and that there is nothing in the record which is 
intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony. 
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Applying this "test" to the case at bar, it is clear that the 
Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in 
reaching their conclusion. In examining the entire record, it is 
readily apparent that there is a great deal of evidence which is 
contradictory. Mrs. Wilson claims that she incurred her back 
injury while lifting a portable grill into the back of a truck. 
(R 19, 20, 23) This evidence is contradicted by the statements of 
Mr. Richard Cobb and Mrs. Barbara Dalpias, wherein they both 
contend that Mrs. Wilson did not lift the grill into the truck, 
but rather it was Mr. Cobb, along, who lifted the grill, while 
Mrs. Wilson and Mrs. Dalpias merely steadied it to ensure that the 
grill would not tip over. (R 140-143; exhibits D-7 and D-8) 
Mrs. Wilson alleges that the Administrative Law Judge improperly 
considered these written statements of Mr. Cobb and Mrs. Dalpias 
because said statements were unsupported by oral testimony. It is 
respondents contention that these statements were properly 
considered because of the fact that Mr. Helgesen, counsel for 
Mrs. Wilson, stipulated to the admission of Mrs. Dalpias1 state-
ment. 
(Mr. Helgesen) 
Question: I have a statement, Mrs. Wilson, that appears 
to be from Barbara Dalpias. And you under-
stand she is not here, and she has had 
problems getting here? 
Answer: Dh-huh. 
Mr. Helgesen: So the statement may be entered in the 
record. 
i n 
Question: I have some questions about that. It appears 
that she is saying that you didn't help lift 
that grill. 
Does that make sense to you? 
Answer: She is saying that I didn't help lift the 
grill? Did I hear you correctly, Mr. Helge-
sen? Did she say that I did not help lift the 
grill? 
Mr. Helgesen: I think it would be best, your Honor, if 
we stipulated to the admission of this, and 
have it marked as an exhibit. May we do that? 
The Court: Surely. 
Mr* Helgesen: Then I can question from that: 
The Court: You bet. 
Mr. Silvester: Fine. 
(R 26-27) 
Because the admissibility of Mrs. Dalpias1 statement was 
stipulated to, it was certainly proper for the Administrative Law 
Judge to consider her statement in weighing the evidence. 
Further, because said statement was admissible evidence, it may be 
used to corroborate the statement of Mr. Cobb which also contra-
dicted Mrs. Wilson's testimony. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-1-88 
(1953) , the Industrial Commission is not bound by the usual common 
law or statutory rules of evidence: 
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure 
before commission and hearing examiner—Admis-
sible evidence.—Neither the commission nor 
its hearing examiner shall be bound by the 
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usual common-law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules 
of procedure, other than as herein provided or 
as adopted by the commission pursuant to this 
act. The commission may make its investiga-
tion in such manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights 
of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the Workmenfs Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence 
and use as proof of any fact in dispute all 
evidence deemed material and relevant inclu-
ding, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony 
presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining 
physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by 
the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including 
copies of time sheets, book accounts or other 
records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an 
injured or diseased employee. 
There is an abundance of case law interpreting this statute. 
This Court has long recognized the consider-
able differences that exist between court 
trials and proceedings before administrative 
agencies, and that the technical rules of 
evidence need not be applied in the latter. 
The Court has also held that hearsay evidence 
is admissible in proceedings before the 
Industrial Commission . . . However, a 
finding of fact cannot be based solely on 
hearsay evidence, but must be "supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence competent in a 
court of law." 
Sandy,State Bank Y^Bximball, 636 P.2d 481, 486 
(Utah 1981). See also flagJsf£xd~^-Ifldiis£xial-£jQmmission, 11 U.2d 
312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961); Yacht Club v. Liquor Control Commission, 
681 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1984). 
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Accordingly, because Mrs. Dalpiasfs statement is legal 
evidence which is competent in a court of law, and it makes 
substantially the same averments as Mr. Cobbs statement, it may be 
used to support Mr. Cobbs statement, and it was proper for the 
Industrial Commission to consider such evidence in making its 
findings. 
Thus, because the statements of Mr. Cobb and Mrs. Dalpias are 
in direct contradiction to Mrs. Wilson's testimony, the first 
criteria of the Norris "test" has not been met, and as this "test" 
is set forth in the conjunctive, there is no need to examine the 
remaining 5 criteria. 
It should also be noted that the various reports of attending 
and examining physicians contain much information which is 
contradictory to the testimony of Mrs. Wilson. While Mrs. Wilson 
contends that she incurred back injuries while lifting a portable 
grill within the course of employment, the various reports and 
records appear to indicate otherwise. 
As previously mentioned in the statement of facts, in the 
"Initial Report" to the Public Employees Health Program which was 
signed by Dr. Barton, it was stated that the incident of injury is 
"not known". (R 123; exhibit D-4) Further, in an "Application 
for Treatment" form, Mrs. Wilson stated that her back condition 
developed from "a car wreck 17 years ago; and a job which required 
heavy lifting nine years ago." She also stated in this form, that 
the heavy lifting nine years ago may have caused her back 
problems. (R 130-131; exhibit D-4) 
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Thus, when the entire record is considered, and the numerous 
contradictions are revealed, it is clear that the Industrial 
Commission's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, or wholly 
without cause. Accordingly, the decision is not subject to 
reversal* 
A, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE THE SOLE 
JUDGES OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AND ARE 
NOT REQUIRED TO BELIEVE UNCONTRADICTED 
TESTIMONY UNLESS THERE IS NOTHING IN THE 
RECORD WHICH IS INTRINSICALLY DISCREDITING TO 
THE TESTIMONY. 
In Chief_ Cpnsglidated., Miningn, Company^Vj^Industrigj._Coipmission 
of,Utah, 260 P 271, 274 Utah 1927), the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated: 
[T]his court, in cases arising under the 
Industrial Act, has uniformly held that the 
Industrial Commission are the sole judges of 
the credibility of the witnesses, the weight 
of the evidence, and the facts . • • 
In denying compensation to Mrs, Wilson, the Industrial 
Commission stated that the Applicant's explanation of why she did 
not mention the incident (the alleged accident) to her physicians 
was not convincing. "The applicant's testimony was not 
credible." (R 148) 
Because the Administrative Law Judge was present at the 
hearing and therefore in a position to observe the applicant's 
demeanor, she was in a much better position than this Court to 
evaluate the credibility, or lack thereof, of the Applicant. 
Thus, in accordance with Chief Con_SQlidatgdMj.pj.pg, Company, it is 
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within the sole province of the Industrial Commission to assess 
a witness's credibility in reaching its conclusion. 
This issue of credibility may also be tied into the afore-
mentioned Norris "test" in determining whether or not the 
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The 
second criteria of the Norris "test" states that a decision may be 
arbitrary and capricious if "there is nothing in the record which 
is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony." 
Although there is a plethora of contradiction in the record, 
let us assume for one moment that Mrs. Wilson's testimony was 
uncontradicted. In order for this Court to reverse the Industrial 
Commission's order, it must appear that there is nothing in the 
record which is intrinsically discrediting to Mrs. Wilson's 
testimony. This is clearly not the case. In determining whether 
or not there was anything discrediting to Mrs. Wilson's testimony, 
the Commission looked at the facts and circumstances, and 
determined that Mrs. Wilson's testimony lacked credibility. 
Mrs. Wilson alleges that she was injured on September 7, 1984, yet 
she did not mention to anyone the alleged accident until December 
4, 1984c (R 40) In the Findings of Factf Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, it is stated: 
First, the Applicant did not report any sort 
of industrial involvement to her treating 
physicians until sometime in December of 
1984. The Administrative Law Judge finds it 
very difficult to believe that had the 
incident occurred as described by the Appli-
cant, she would not have made mention of it to 
at least her treating physicians immediately 
upon receiving treatment. The Applicants 
15 
explanation of why she did not mention the 
incident to her physicians was not convincing. 
(R 148) 
Thus, because Mrs. Wilson was not convincing or credible, her 
testimony was intrinsically discrediting, and therefore the 
Industrial Commissions decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 
A case which further supports respondent's position is 
Mssell^v^Industrial_Cpmmissi^n, 43 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1935) wherein 
this Court stated: 
In the instant case there is no direct 
evidence as to when, how, or where Mr. Russell 
received the blister on his toe. He may have 
received the injury while he was working at 
the mill, but he may, so far as the evidence 
discloses, have received it elsewhere. When 
any one of two or more inferences may reason-
ably be drawn from the evidence, this court is 
not authorized to direct which inference must 
be drawn, and, likewise, when, as in the 
instant case, it is somewhat of a speculation 
as to where or how the deceased received the 
injury complained of, this court is precluded 
from directing an award. To entitle the 
plaintiff to prevail upon this review the 
evidence must be such that the only reasonable 
inference permissible is that Mr. Russen 
received an accidental injury growing out of 
or in the course of his employment and that 
such injury resulted in his death. The 
evidence before us does not measure up to that 
standard. The commission may well have 
entertained grave doubt as to when and where 
Mr. Russell received the blister on his toe. 
43 P.2d at 1073. 
The Russell holding may be applied to the case at bar. 
Mrs. Wilson may have received her injury as she alleges, but, so 
far as the evidence discloses, she may have received it 
elsewhere. As in Russell# the cause of Mrs. Wilson's injury is 
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speculative, and there is more than one inference which may be 
drawn from the evidence. Accordingly, this Court is precluded 
from directed an award, 
CONCLUSION 
In denying compensation benefits to Mrs. Wilson, the 
Industrial Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously, 
wholly without cause, or contrary to the one inevitable conclusion 
from the evidence. Rather, the record is full of contradictory 
evidence such that there is not one inevitable conclusion to be 
drawn. And, inasmuch as it is not within the province of this 
Court to measure the relative probabilities, respondent's herein 
respectfully request that the Utah Supreme Court affirm the order 
of the Industrial Commission which denied benefits to Ida Joyce 
Wilson. 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
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